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The so-called great migration in Kyrgyzstan be-
gan in 1989 just before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. With controls on mobility largely lifted as 
a result of perestroika, internal migration flowed 
from remote and mountainous areas, especially 
in the north, to the valleys and towns. The period 
1990–94 saw the relocation of entire families—
for example, from settlements in the Chui Valley 
such as Kemin to the capital Bishkek, or from the 
Naryn region to Kemin. The second stage of in-
ternal migration, from 1994 to 1999, saw contin-
uing albeit decreased movements between re-
gions and increased relocation from rural to ur-
ban areas. Today four main directions persist: 
from rural to urban areas, from remote moun-
tainous areas to valleys, from the periphery to 
administrative and economic centers, and more 
generally from the south to the north. Of course, 
these vectors are intertwined and cannot be con-
sidered separately.  
 
The northern and southern parts of Kyrgyzstan, 
and within them their respective urban centers 
and rural peripheries, display disparities in their 
social and economic levels of development. This 
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What are the main reasons behind internal 
migration in Kyrgyzstan, especially the flows 
from rural regions to cities and those from 
mountainous regions to valleys? 
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inequality arose during Soviet rule and has been 
exacerbated since independence. Another factor 
in the growing gap is differing levels of education, 
with the Chui Valley and the capital offering more 
high education institutions than the rest of the 
country. And while the difference in the levels of 
development propelled internal migration after 
independence, the low level of education of many 
migrants has contributed to their continued mar-
ginalization, along with the lack of employment 
opportunities in the cities.  
 
Ownership of land and the ability to cultivate it 
also factored into levels of rural migration. In its 
2007 report, Kyrgyz Republic Poverty Assessment, 
the World Bank noted the difference between the 
north and south in terms of land parcel sizes: 
land parcels in the less populated north were on 
average two hectares in size with 21 percent of 
the population owning at least one parcel of land; 
but in the more populated south in 2003, only 10 
percent of people owned land parcels of this size. 
The prospect of larger plots of land available in 
the north, together with the attraction of what 
were perceived to be easier ways to earn money 
in urban areas, prompted large migratory move-
ments from rural southern areas to Bishkek, and 




An International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) report from 2000, Internal Migration in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, cited the multiple economic, 
social, environmental, and political causes of in-
ternal migration. The search for a job and pursu-
ing studies were quoted as the most important 
reasons by respondents of the IOM survey. Out-
migration is particularly visible in mountainous 
regions where the socioeconomic situation is 
much worse. The poor condition of roads, irregu-
lar transport, and administrative barriers impede 
market access. The lack of access to television, 
radio, newspapers, good schools and universities, 
as well as adequate medical facilities have served 
as additional factors that motivate young people 
to migrate not only from rural to urban areas but 
also abroad. Labor migrants from the mountain-
ous regions prefer to invest their earnings in the 
relocation of their families to lower-lying valleys 
and other areas where life is much easier than in 
the high mountains. Labor migration from the 
highlands may indeed herald the long-term col-




Economic reasons, such as a lack of jobs, shortage 
of land, and low incomes, are the most frequently 
cited by various experts and the media for migra-
tion. In addition, the poor state of infrastructure 
and shortage of basic services (education, medi-
cal treatment, and so on) are also important. Mi-
gration also occurs as a result of environmental 
degradation in risk-prone areas, which include 
communities affected by earthquakes, landslides, 
floods, droughts, and in some cases radiation 
from uranium tailing sites.  
 
However, it is also important to see the phenom-
enon from a historical perspective. It can be ar-
gued that the current trends of migration are an 
outcome of the failure of Soviet collectivization 
and industrialization. In pre-Soviet times, the 
Kyrgyz lived as nomads that frequently moved 
along their pastoral routes. During the Soviet 
period, however, kolkhozes and sovkhozes were 
established for the purposes of managing and 
collectivizing agriculture, with the result that 
large numbers of Kyrgyz were forcefully settled. 
A completely new pattern of settlement in the 
regions emerged around this division of land, 
with new villages springing up in very remote 
areas. During Soviet times, agriculture was subsi-
dized by the state and farmers received salaries 
even if the harvest was bad. The state administra-
tion addressed matters of entertainment and 
social life of residents and was responsible for 
their education and proper medical treatment. 
Specialists as well as recent university and col-
lege graduates were routinely sent to outlying 
regions as doctors, agrarians, and veterinarians. 
As a result, by the early 1990s, the rural regions 
of Kyrgyzstan had a stable growing population, 
and a very rigid system of propiska (residence 
permit) that did not allow rural residents to move 
freely to cities.  
 
Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the land was 
privatized and divided equally among members 
of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes. By law the land 
still belongs to the state, but it is leased to farm-
ers for a period of 99 years. However, with state 
support withdrawn, agriculture was no longer 
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subsidized and new owners had to rely only on 
their own resources to make a profit from work-
ing their plots of land. Not all farmers had the 
necessary means (machinery, fertilizers, seeds) 
to cultivate the land and many were given land in 
dry regions without irrigation. Pasture lands 
were also privatized and the return to animal 
husbandry made sense for many rural residents. 
However, contrary to  pre-Soviet times, when 
there were no limitations on the movement of 
stock (as long as they stayed within the bounda-
ries of the large pastures belonging to kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes), the new division of pasture lands 
significantly limited the amount of land available 
to individual stock owners for grazing their cattle. 
Their attempt to maximize profits from their pas-
tures led to overgrazing and soil erosion, which 
also resulted in a higher frequency of floods and 
landslides. All these factors contributed to the 
economic crisis in the rural areas, leading to pov-
erty and outmigration, both internal and external. 
The specific settlement pattern created by the 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes—and their redivision—





The official statistics on the internal movement of 
people cannot provide accurate data on internal 
migration due to the fact that it contains infor-
mation only on migrants who have officially de-
registered their home addresses and who have 
registered their arrival at a new destination. Ac-
cording to various surveys, at least 32 percent of 
internal migrants are not registered in their new 
places of residence, especially in the cities of 
Bishkek and Osh.  
 
Kyrgyzstan faces a paradoxical situation. There 
has been a process of de-urbanization of most 
small and medium-sized towns and cities, which 
is indicative of the country’s de-industrialization 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the oth-
er hand, the capital city and the Chui region have 
witnessed hyper-urbanization—Bishkek has a 
population of one million equating to nearly 20 
percent of the country’s population—due to the 
massive influx of rural residents. Today the most 
popular destinations for internal migration are 
the cities of Bishkek and Osh, and the Chui oblast. 
A survey of potential migrants showed that 42 
percent indicated their preference of relocating 
to Bishkek, 30 percent intended to move abroad, 
while 13 percent wanted to move to the Chui 
oblast. Whereas some “rural” suburbs of large 
cities and those rural areas easily accessible by 
transport from big cities may be experiencing 
population growth, the prospects for those small 
villages and settlements located far away from 
the large cities, and which are relatively difficult 




There are several different types of small provin-
cial towns in Kyrgyzstan and their fates and mi-
gration patterns vary. The worst scenario affects 
the remoter towns (often situated at the end of a 
road) such as the former mining towns of Ak-
Tyuz and Kok-Jangak situated in the north and 
west of the country, respectively. Just as collectiv-
ization reorganized rural life and saw the emer-
gence of new villages, these towns owed their 
existence to the Soviet industrialization process: 
mining towns in Kyrgyzstan—there are more 
than twenty of them—were built to exploit the 
country’s minerals, coal, metals, and uranium, 
which were exported as raw materials to Russia 
and other Soviet republics. These industries were 
often unprofitable and were significantly subsi-
dized by Moscow. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the subsidies stopped and the mines were 
privatized. Driven by short-term profit, the new 
owners sold off the expensive machinery to Chi-
nese and Kazakh entrepreneurs, while factory 
buildings (including some workers’ apartments) 
were disassembled and sold as bricks. The facto-
ry workers were made redundant and with no 
other job prospects were forced to migrate. The 
majority of these residents were ethnic Russians. 
Many of them migrated to Russia, while some 
moved to Bishkek.  
 
Other mining towns, especially those located on 
transport routes, fared slightly better. Residents 
What is the migration situation in small, 
provincial cities such as Naryn, Karakol, and 
Talas? As parts of their population leave for 
bigger cities and abroad, are migrants arriv-
ing from surrounding rural regions to take 
their place? 
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there have been able to engage in small-scale 
trade, such as in Tash-Komur located on the Osh–
Bishkek road, or profit from the tourism industry, 
like Kadji-Say on the southern shore of Issyk-Kul. 
In other provincial towns, mostly regional admin-
istrative centers, the situation depended signifi-
cantly on their location. Towns like Karakol and 
Balykchy have benefited significantly from the 
tourism industry around Lake Issyk-Kul; towns 
such as Kara-Suu, Uzgen, and Bazar-Korgon have 
profited from trade with neighboring Uzbekistan. 
Accordingly, migration from these towns has not 
been as marked as elsewhere. Similarly, towns in 
the Chui Valley, such as Tokmok, Kant, and Kara-
Balta, have benefited from their proximity to 
Bishkek and even experienced inflows of mi-
grants from the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. 
However, provincial towns in the remote Batken 
and Naryn regions (like Isfana and Naryn) have 
fared much worse and have become depopulated 




Small provincial cities are the targets of internal 
migration from surrounding villages, with rural 
migrants trying to buy apartments in town. This 
small-scale migration is therefore a form of in-
vestment-based mobility. On the contrary, Naryn 
and other towns are not considered to be attrac-
tive prospects, because of their lack of economic 
development, and so do not entice villagers from 
surrounding areas. Moreover, migrants who leave 
their villages for regional centers do not often 
stay for long and seek to migrate to Bishkek or 
abroad relatively quickly. Regional cities are 
therefore regarded as merely stopovers on the 




The previous governments ratified some pro-
grams for the development of regions and gener-
ating employment, but most of them were very 
small in scale and inefficient. The new govern-
ment of Amazbek Atambayev, on the contrary, 
has announced ambitious plans of building a new 
railway through Kyrgyzstan, constructing hy-
droelectric dams, and attracting investors for 
exploiting the country’s mineral wealth. They 
expect these projects to produce jobs and revive 
life in the regions. Some major agreements and 
contracts have already been signed, mostly with 
Russian firms. It remains to be seen how success-
ful they will be in terms of rejuvenating the coun-
try’s regions. In regard to the migrant-receiving 
cities, particularly Bishkek (the main destination 
for internal migrants), there is no specific gov-
ernment policy. While there is a law on internal 
migration, it does not impose any limitations on 
the freedom of movement inside Kyrgyzstan.  
 
In my view, a careful resettlement policy should 
be considered. This policy should take into ac-
count the country’s geopolitical situation, its 
topographical challenges, the existence of en-
claves, and the incomplete delimitation and de-
marcation of its borders (excluding China with 
which agreements have been signed), as well as 
the low population density in the border areas.  
All these factors make Kyrgyzstan vulnerable to 
external threats. The unequal transport network 
and settlement of the country undermines its 
socio-cultural unity and connectivity between 
regions. Accordingly, any policy should take into 
account the need for a more balanced settlement 





The Kyrgyz government has not devised any con-
crete policy regulations, but still there are some 
mechanisms to stem uncontrolled internal mobil-
ity through, for example, the fulfilling of certain 
requirements when buying land in provincial 
cities. There have also been some attempts to 
enforce regulations at the level of ail okmotu (lo-
cal authorities) but the authorities lack the re-
sources to do so. Moreover, the political system 
means that politicians tend to consider migrants 
as an important source of votes and, therefore, 
they are not keen to adopt any regulation that 






Does the Kyrgyz government have any poli-
cy to regulate internal migration, both in 
rural regions and in receiving cities? 
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The history of Bishkek’s novostroiki can be 
traced back to the end of the 1980s. Factory 
workers were the first to occupy plots of land, 
without official permission. Those who occupy 
land without legal title to it are called squatters, 
samozakhvat in Russian. In 1989, when the first 
wave of samozahvat occurred in Bishkek, most of 
the land claimed was connected to or situated 
close to the factories. Officials of the city were not 
able to control this process and finally legalized it 
through apportioning plots of land among work-
ers according to existing property lines.  
 
Novostroiki now occupy what were previously 
open fields and have contributed to the sprawl of 
the capital Bishkek. It is difficult to calculate the 
exact number of internal migrants who have 
moved to the capital because the relevant author-
ities in charge of this sector are unable to control 
it. For those who own a house in a suburban area, 
they first need to register their house and plot of 
land, which is complicated by multiple bureau-
cratic offices with overlapping mandates. For 
those who rent, the registration is a more compli-
cated process. Yet the overwhelming majority of 
migrants are not required to register in munici-
palities when working in the informal sector or 
for renting rooms in the suburbs. Studies have 
indicated that there are as many as 300,000 in-
habitants in the novostroiki, but this figure can-
not reliably reflect the actual number of people 
who arrive and depart from the capital every 
season. 
 
In Bishkek the majority of migrants are engaged 
in the bazaars, the biggest of which are Dordoy 
and Osh. These bazaars provide many small ser-
vices like food outlets, salons, currency exchange 
booths, and telecommunications—all of which 
employ a large number of migrants. Another im-
portant kind of activity for male migrants is the 
transportation of goods for customers or sellers. 
Many women, on the other hand, work as clean-
ers in the bazaars. Some migrants are further 
engaged in the expanding private construction 
sector. While some form teams of workers, others 
just seek labor on a daily basis in low-skilled 
work. Sewing workshops are another essential 
sub-sector of informal labor involving a large 
number of women migrants. The next large seg-
ment is room rental, which is directly dependent 
on migration to the city. Depending on the in-
come of a particular family owning a plot of land 
in one of the suburbs, especially those situated 
near a bazaar (like Kelechek), anywhere from one 
to a dozen rooms can be available for rent. Spe-
cially adapted to cater for migrants, such houses 
typically contain a number of rooms each with a 
separate entrance. Finally, several small kinds of 
informal business are to be found in the 
novostroiki: bania (bath-houses), navoikana or 
tandyr (a special oven for the round baked bread 
lepyoshka), small cafés, and shops of varying sizes 
commonly called komok (kiosk). A large number 
of komoks, navoikanas, and cafés can be observed 




In my opinion there is a need to tone down the 
media hype on depicting migrants as a challenge 
or a threat. They are simply Kyrgyz citizens 
searching for a better life for themselves and 
their children. Nevertheless, two main issues for 
migrants need be addressed: obtaining their resi-
dence permits (propiska) and getting access to 
medical care. However, the challenge seen from 
the point of view of the authorities is that Bish-
kek’s infrastructure is experiencing extreme 
pressure, as it was not designed for the increas-




The main challenges for migrants living in the 
novostroiki are related to registration of their 
plots, to the poor infrastructure (roads, electrici-
ty, water, gas, sewage), and access to basic social 
services (education, medical treatment, social 
security). If the property is legalized, many of the 
issues are somewhat easier to resolve. However, 
some novostroiki are built in places which cannot 
be legalized—Ak-Jar, Altyn-Kazyk, TEC-2, and 
parts of Ala-Too, for example. The illegal status 
creates many difficulties and frequently pushes 
What are the main challenges faced by mi-
grants living in the novostroiki of Bishkek’s 
suburbs? Are the novostroiki becoming 
sites of potential political and social un-
rest? 
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residents into taking political action, such as clos-
ing roads and protesting in front of Parliament.  
 
I believe, though, that portraying novostroiki as 
places of political and social unrest has no solid 
basis. A large number of residents are hardwork-
ing traders in Bishkek’s bazaars or workers in the 
growing apparel industry. Many have stable in-
comes and obtain support in the form of migrant 
remittances from Russia. Of course, they are sub-
ject to political manipulation, but they are not 
different in that sense from other city residents, 
and to date there is very little research evidence 
to show that novostroiki residents were particu-
larly active in the last two revolutions (2005 and 
2010) in Kyrgyzstan. With time the residents of 
the novostroiki will use their political connec-
tions, resources, and support from international 
organizations to improve the living conditions of 
their places of abode and so gradually transform 
the novostroiki into organic parts of the city.  
 
Bermet Zhumakadyr kyzy 
 
The main challenges faced by migrants living in 
Bishkek’s novostroiki are the consequences of the 
illegal status of the new settlements. Some of the-
se settlements lack or have no developed services 
such as running water, electricity, or paved roads. 
Furthermore, in cases such as Altyn Kazyk on the 
outskirts of Bishkek, there seems to be no hope in 
the near future of gaining legal status due to its 
location in an area classified as hazardous, which 
prevents the settlement from legally acquiring 
basic services. No less important is the daily 
stress these residents face: they live in uncertain-
ty of whether their houses will be removed or if 
they will be granted legal status which will enable 
them to build their lives there. 
 
It is not uncommon for novostroiki to be por-
trayed by the local media as places of political 
and social unrest. Although this is not entirely 
false, as was witnessed in the Aksu popular riots 
against the cession of territory to China in 2002, 
the revolutions of March 2005 and April 2010, 
and more generally during election periods, 
where the novostroiki saw protests, they are no 
more sites of potential political unrest than other 
parts of the city, the bazaars, or other regions of 
Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, in terms of political 
mobilization and protests, which have the poten-
tial to lead to political and social unrest, it is nec-
essary to distinguish between those novostroiki 
that are more politically active (whether through 
protests or lobbying politicians), such as Kalys 
Ordo or Ak Jar, and others which appear to be 
more apathetic and less prone to mobilization, 
like Altyn Kazyk.  
 
 
 
 
